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RECENT DECISIONS
opinion, "If the doctrine is to be abolished, reason and common sense
dictate that the doctrine should be abolished as to all charitable in-
stitutions .. ."19 Abolishing it only as to hospitals will require
periodic pronouncements as to the liability of each class of charities.
This piecemeal determination of such an important issue can only de-
lay the inevitable-the total destruction of the doctrine. Therefore,
though the court has rung the death knell for charitable immunity
once, the incompleteness of its ruling will require that the bell be
tolled again and again.
IRVING M. PORTNOY
FRANK A. MYsLIwIEc
CONFLICT OF LAws-Torts should be governed by the local law of the
state which has the most significant relationship with the occur-
rence and the parties.
Griffith v. United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
For over 100 years the law of Pennsylvania has been clearly
settled, namely, the substantive rights of the parties, as well
as the damages recoverable are governed by the law of the
place of the wrong or as it is sometimes expressed, the law
of the place where the injury occurred- lex loci delicti:
[citing cases].1
Thus begins the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice John C. Bell, Jr.
in Griffith v. United Airlines, 2 in which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court abandons this choice of law rule established in Pennsylvania
as early as 1830. 3 The majority of the court replaces this conflict
of law with one which holds that ". . . torts should be governed by
the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship
with the occurrence and the parties .... -4
On July 11, 1961, after purchasing a round-trip ticket from United
Airlines (United) in Philadelphia, George H. Hambrecht, a Penn-
19. See Jones' dissenting opinion in Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital,
supra note 3 at ............. & n  1.
1. Griffith v. United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1, 26, 203 A.2d 796, 809 (1964). (dis-
senting opinion of Bell, C.J.).
2. Griffith v. United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
3. Barclay v. Thompson, 2 Pen. & W. 148 (1830).
4. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (1964).
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sylvania domiciliary, boarded a United Airlines plane in Philadelphia
bound for Pheonix, Arizona. United, a Delaware corporation with
its principle place of business in Chicago, regularly does business
and maintains operational facilities in Pennsylvania. In the course
of a scheduled stop in Denver, Colorado, the plane crashed and Ham-
brecht was killed instantaneously. Mr. Hambrecht's will was pro-
bated in Pennsylvania. His executor instituted an action in assump-
sit for negligent breach of a contract of safe carriage under the
Pennsylvania survival act 5 in the Court of Common Pleas of Phila-
delphia County.
The lower court held, under a long line of conflict of law decisions
in Pennsylvania, 6 that Colorado local law should be applied as it
was the situs of the tort, and required plaintiff to amend his com-
plaint to demand recovery under Colorado local law. When the plain-
tiff refused to do so, the court dismissed his complaint. "The crux of
this litigation lies in the differing measures of recovery granted in
Colorado and Pennsylvania .... "7 Colorado's survival statute8 limits
damages in tort actions to loss of earnings and expenses incurred
prior to death, and does not allow recovery for ". . . pain, suffering or
disfigurement, nor prospective profits or earnings after date of
death. . ... 9 Under the Pennsylvania survival statute, 1 0 recovery
may be had for prospective profits or earnings during life expec-
tancy.11 Since the deceased died immediately, there would be little,
if any, recovery under the Colorado local law, while Pennsylvania
local law provides a substantial recovery. The supreme court found
the lower court order appealable. ' 2
Before reaching the choice of law problem the supreme court con-
sidered whether the action could properly be brought in assumpsit.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.603 (1949).
6. See Vant v. Gish, 412 Pa. 359, 365-66, 194 A.2d 522, 526 (1963); Bernaro-
wicz v. Vetrone, 400 Pa. 385, 162 A.2d 687 (1960); Mike v. Lian, 322 Pa. 353, 185
AV. 775 (1936); Barclay v. Thompson 2 Pen. & W. 148 (1830).
7. Supra note 2 at 6, 203 A.2d at 798.
8. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN., Chapter 152, 152-1-9 (Supp. 1960).
9. Ibid. (emphasis added).
10. Supra note 5.
11. "Under the Pennsylvania Survival Statute, recovery may be had for the
present worth of decedent's likely earnings during the period of his life expect-
ancy, diminished by the probable cost of his own maintenance during the time
he would have lived and also by the amount of provision he would have made for
the support of his wife and children during the same period." Supra note 2 at 7,
203 A.2d at 798.
12. "An order sustaining preliminary objections to a complaint is definitive,
and therefore appealable, where it so restricts the pleader in respect of further
amendment as, virtually, to put him out of court on the cause of action he seeks
to litigate: (citing cases]." Supra note 2 at 6, 203 A.2d at 789.
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United felt that the Pennsylvania Aeronautical Code' 3 required the
suit to be brought in trespass, as did the allegations of negligent
carriage. If United had been able to convince the supreme court of
this, then they would argue that under Pennsylvania choice of law
rules, Colorado local law applies. Since Colorado local law grants
meager damages the potential liability would be insignificant. But
the supreme court found the Aeronautical Code meant that ". . . in
tort actions for injuries sustained in air disasters, no special rules
[are] applicable ... to airplanes .... The rules of negligence... re-
main the same for airplanes as for other carriers."'1 4 The statute
then had no effect upon this litigation as its purpose was merely to
establish that in tort actions there are no special rules where air-
planes are involved. There is no requirement that the suit be brought
in trespass. The court also had to answer whether it would allow a
passenger to sue in assumpsit against a carrier where his cause of
action is based upon breach of contract of non-negligent carriage.
The liability depends upon negligence, as there is no assurance by
the carrier of safe carriage. The court recalled that it allowed suits
in assumpsit or trespass for damages to shipped goods in the same
circumstances and, "We can not preceive .... any compelling reason
for Pennsylvania to restrict an injured passenger to an action in
trespass . . . We hold, therefore, that plaintiff may bring a valid ac-
tion in assumpsit for the alleged negligent breach of contract of
carriage which caused the death of plaintiff's decedent."' 1 5
But at this point, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to
be bound up in technicalties. Plaintiff argued that since this was an
assumpsit action and the Colorado limitation applied only to tort
actions, the Colorado limitation was inapplicable here. The court
looked to the recovery demanded--clearly a tort recovery-resting
upon the negligently caused death governed by tort and not contract
principles. "Mere technicalities of pleading should not blind us to
the true nature of the action."' 1 6 Since the case depended on tort
principles for a tort recovery, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court felt
bound to follow the Colorado local law limitation, if Pennsylvania
choice of law rules were to be adhered to, regardless of the form of
action declared upon. The case was now squarely within the Penn-
sylvania choice of law rule that the substantive law where the injury
occurred would control, i.e. Colorado local law with its meager re-
13. "The liability of the owner or pilot of an aircraft carrying passengers
for injury or death to such passengers, shall be determined by the rules of law
applicable to torts on the lands or waters of this Commonwealth arising out of
similar relationship." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1472 (1933).
14. Supra note 2 at 8, 203 A.2d at 799.
15. Id. at 10, 203 A.2d at 800.
16. Ibid.
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covery. This is a harsh result when Colorado had no connection with
the case except the ". . . purely adventitious circumstances that the
accident occurred there." 17 At this point, the supreme court felt it
was time to abandon this inflexible choice of law rule based upon
the vested rights doctrine and replace it with one based upon the
various states' connections with the occurrence, the parties and the
policies behind the various states' laws.
This new choice of law rule set forth in the Restatement of Con-
flict of Laws, 2d § 379 will apparently provide the guidelines for
Pennsylvania. The court looked to certain contacts to determine
the state with the most significant relationship to the parties and
issues. Vital contacts are: place of injury, place of conduct, domicile
of parties, and the place where the relationship between the parties
is centered. The contacts are weighed by considering the issues, the
nature of the tort, and the purposes of the tort rules involved.
When one looks to the contacts of this case and the states' policies
involved, the change of law does not seem so very undesirable.
Colorado had no contact with the parties or action except the acci-
dent occurring in Colorado. There was no reliance upon Colorado law
by the parties, anymore than there was upon that of each state the
plane passed over. There was no medical aid nor assistance given
in Colorado because of the instantaneous death. In looking at the
policy behind-the Colorado limitation upon damages, the court found
that it was probably to prevent speculative damages or procedural
considerations of local concern. But when Pennsylvania is willing
to grant such damages, Colorado should be unconcerned. Another
reason might have been to protect Colorado defendants from large
verdicts. But here no Colorado domiciliaries are involved and there
is no surprise to United as there was no reliance upon Colorado law
to its detriment. (i.e., no issue of not carrying adequate insurance
because of reliance upon Colorado law).
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court looked to Pennsylvania's in-
terests, it found the deceased was a Pennsylvania domiciliary whose
family still resided there, his estate was probated there and the
contract between he and the defendant was entered into there. The
Pennsylvania interest in the estate and care of these dependents are
weighty considerations in granting damages. The policy behind
Pennsylvania law in granting full recovery is so strong that the
Pennsylvania Constitution' 8 takes away the legislature's power to
limit damages for injury or death except in certain enumerated
cases.
17. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y. 2d 473, 481, 191 N.E. 2d 279, 283 (1963).
18. Pa. Const. art. III, § 21 (1915).
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Once one looks away from the physical point where the accident
occurs, and investigates the policy of both states' laws and the con-
tacts with the issues and the parties, one begins to doubt the basic
value of the ancient rule based upon the situs of the tort. Pennsyl-
vania with its weightier contacts and strong public policy towards
adequate relief should control, as against the prior lex loci delicti
rule, developed in an age when all the contacts developed in one state
consistently, which does not fit modern day circumstances.
JOHN W. MCGONIGLE
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw-Reapportionment-The Pennsylvania Re-
apportionment Act held unconstitutional.
Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 203 A. 2d 556 (1964)
The courts of this land until recently, were hesitant to decide state
legislature apportionment questions.1 This subject was generally
deemed political in nature, thus not properly one for judicial de-
termination. In 1962, however, the United States Supreme Court
said that dilution of citizens voting power caused by apportionment
not substantially based on population presented a justiciable con-
troversy for the federal courts.2 Since then the judicial tribunals
of the several states have been flooded with "apportionment" litiga-
tion-Pennsylvania has been no exception. In 1962 Pennsylvania
taxpayers filed complaints in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin
County challenging the constitutionality of th legislative appor-
tionment law.3 The case was held over by the Common Pleas Court
and adjudication of the issues was deferred until the legislature had
a sufficient opportunity to enact new apportionment legislation at its
next session. Subsequently, two new apportionment bills were en-
acted 4 and signed into law. These two new apportionment laws
were challenged by the plaintiffs by petitioning the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania to take jurisdiction of the case. The court granted
the petition. Thus, the court was faced with a question involving
1. Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946); Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991
(1957).
2. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
3. Butcher v. Trimarchi, 28 Pa. D. & C. 2d, 537 (1962). Act of May 10,
1921, P.L. 449, as amended, 25 P.S. §2201. Act of July 29, 1953, P.L. 956, 25 P.S.
§2215.
4. Act of January 9, 1964, P.L. 3, 25 P.S. §2221 (Supp. 1963). Act of
January 9. 1964, P.L. 4, 25 P.S. §2217 (Supp. 1963).
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